home | 1901-World War II | World War to December 1914

Von Moltke. He feared German
weakness.

Germany Fumbles Diplomatically

Many Germans believed in their nation standing up "in a manly way" for its place in a competitive, dog-eat-dog world. And some Germans favored policy that would appeal to the patriotism of common Germans, a patriotism they hoped would help diminish the growing political power of the labor movement, represented in parliament by the Social Democrats.

In the spring of 1911 came another crisis over Morocco, beginning when rebels there besieged the sultan, Mulay Hafid, at his palace at Fez. The sultan appealed to the French to rescue him. The Germans feared that if French troops went to Fez they would stay. The German government protested against French intervention, but France sent troops to Fez anyway - and Spain sent troops to occupy that part of Morocco that France had promised in secret agreements in 1904. The Germans claimed that France's move violated the settlement they had agreed to back in April 1906. Germany's hawkish press expressed exasperation with France and demanded that Germany's position in Morocco be maintained and respected, and these demands were widely supported by the German public.

The German government demonstrated its resolve concerning Morocco by avoiding talk. Mere words were seen as weakness. Instead they sent a warship "The Panther" to the port of Agadir on Morocco's southwestern coast. Germany's show of force was an embarrassment to France's prime minister, Joseph Caillaux, who was a politically progressive, wealthy financier who had desired peace and reconciliation with Germany. Caillaux was pushing for tax reform in France, and French politicians opposed to Caillaux's tax reform used Germany's belligerence to win opposition to his government. Anti-German torchlight parades erupted. Caillaux's government fell, and Caillaux was replaced by Raymond Poincaré, who supported and helped inspire a new patriotism in France, a new spirit of confidence and pride. The possibility of reconciliation between Germany and France was lost and a new and aggressive French policy toward Germany was launched. The French, announced Poincaré, did not want war, but neither did they fear it. Poincaré announced that the first duty of a good citizen was to be "a courageous and disciplined soldier." He denounced "internationalists" and pacifists and spoke of the province that France had lost to Germany in the war of 1870-71, Lorraine, the place of his birth, as "a bulwark" for France.

Germany's standing up "in a manly way" against the French over Morocco not only stirred up French belligerence, it disturbed the British. A desire for a rapprochement with Germany that had been developing in Britain quickly evaporated. British strategists were frightened into believing that they should stand firmly by their alliances with France and Russia. Britain signed an agreement with France that allowed a more efficient use of both their navies. The agreement held that should war break out, Britain was to defend the waters between it and France and the waters along France's  Atlantic Coast, while France's navy was to act in behalf of both nations in the Mediterranean Sea.

In Germany those favoring peace and negotiations won for Germany a negotiated settlement of differences with France, signed in Berlin in November 1911. Germany agreed to France establishing a protectorate over Morocco, and, in exchange, Germany received a little strip of land from the French Congo, giving Germany's colony, Kamerun (Cameroon) access to the Congo River. This agreement outraged Germany's hawks. In parliament they accused the German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, and Germany's secretary of state, von Kiderlen, of "unforgivable" timidity.Chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke (the younger), saw his country as having crawled away from the negotiations with its tail between its legs.

The Slide from 1911 to 1914

With Poincaré, the French had begun building up their military forces, and Germany countered. A new arms race was underway. A few dissident intellectuals in Europe had been trying to warn their nations about how different a war among the great industrial powers of Europe would be from wars of the previous century. But Germany's military leaders continued to believe that the next war could be as short and sweet as their last victory - six months of war against France that ended in 1871 with only 28,000 dead. That had been a war in which speed in mobilization was most important, in other words a matter of getting to the battle first with the most. It had been a war in which no stalemate and trench warfare had developed. There was also the belief among leaders that the war might be prolonged. German army at any rate had a strategy for the next war, believing that the best defense was an offense. Its leadership was confident that their plan to march to Paris across the shortest route - through Belgium - would bring victory within a few weeks. Marching through Belgium they believed was the best plan. The French were also burdened by misconception regarding military matters - not only about the duration of the next war but also about how the war should be fought. A commander-in-chief designate of France's armies, General Victor Michel, correctly anticipated that Germany's drive against France would come through the lowlands of Belgium, and he advocated taking defensive positions against the Germans. The dominant view among France's generals was that they should pursue an offensive strategy. Michel was ostracized and demoted. Victory, they believed would be achieved by the fighting spirit of their armies. This included putting aside machine guns because, they believed, machine guns were for defense. They were opposed to discontinuing the use of the army's red trousers and blue jackets, colors they thought matched the army's élan and glory. And they believed that Russia's vast army - the "Russian steamroller" - would provide effective help. 

Amid all the backward thinking about war, in 1911 a minor war erupted, Italy responding to France's gains in Morocco by seeking gain of its own in North Africa. Italy warred against the Ottoman Empire for possession of Tripoli and Cyrenaica - today, Libya. The Turks lost and appeared weak to Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, and these nations, in May, 1912, these countries thought it opportune to fight the Turks for territory they believed was theirs. Germany backed the Turks and France backed Serbia. The Turks lost again, and in October the Turks were forced to grant independence to Albania. Then Serbia and Greece began fighting with Bulgaria over the spoils of victory. In 1913, Serbia emerged from these wars triumphant. Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hercegovina) were elated and encouraged. Serbia and Greece divided Macedonia between them, and Serbia moved to acquire a port on the Albanian coast.

Austria-Hungary feared Serbia's new prestige and disliked the aroused Serbian nationalism. In Bosnia, Austrian authorities seized local newspapers, expelled student leaders and put schools under direct military rule. Austria-Hungary opposed Serbia's acquisition of a seaport on the Albanian coast, and it threatened Serbia with war. Russia announced its determination to support Serbia militarily. Serbia wanted no war with Austria-Hungary and withdrew from the Albanian coastline, and Emperor Wilhelm of Germany refused to give military support to Austria-Hungary. Wilhelm's treaty with Austria-Hungary was defensive, and he felt no obligation to back Austria-Hungary in an offensive against Serbia. Austria-Hungary feared war against Russia without Germany fighting on its side, and so war was averted.

The year 1913 ended with leading strategists in Austria-Hungary still favoring war against Serbia, and against Russia if Russia intervened. Austria-Hungary's military leaders feared Russia's growing military capability, and they favored getting the war with Serbia over with before Russia strengthened its military forces.

The hawks in Austria-Hungary had an ally in Germany's supreme army commander, von Moltke, who wrote his Austrian counterpart that a war between "Germandom" (which included German Austrians) and "Slavdom" (the Russians and Serbs) was inevitable. Von Moltke believed that "eternal peace" was a "pipe dream" and that if war were inevitable it would be best to launch it at a most opportune time. He too was concerned about the growing strength of Russia's military, and he believed it would be opportune to have a war before Russia and France had time to reduce significantly the gap in military capability between themselves and Germany. Germany's Admiral von Tirpitz also appears to have wanted war, but not with Britain. He believed that Germany should not go to war until it had completed widening the Kiel Canal for Germany's new fleet of submarines - estimated to be finished in 1916.

In Germany were many opposed to war, including Social Democrats and some businessmen. But Germany had its paranoid types - super defensive and aggressive toward perceived enemies. They believed that Britain and its allies were bent on war against Germany, and they favored a "preventive war."  Some others were willing to go to war at any time. They remembered with pride the German victory over France in 1871, and they looked forward to the next war engendering a spirit of heroism and self-sacrifice in the place of the materialism and moral rot that they saw around them. And, with optimism, they looked forward to the next war settling the disquieting differences that had risen among the European powers.

In Russia, those around the tsar who favored peace with Germany were losing influence to those who had grown more hostile to Germany. These more hostile men were displeased by German and Austrian economic penetration into the Balkans and Germany's growing economic ties with the Ottoman Empire. Germany had sold weapons to Turkey in its recent wars, and following Turkey's defeat, Germany had begun reorganizing Turkey's military, and the Russians saw this as a threat to Russia's shipping through the Black Sea into the Mediterranean.

The Assassination

Archduke Ferdinand was aware of the passions and hostility by Bosnian Serbs against Habsburg rule. In 1910, Franz Joseph had visited Bosnia’s capital, Sarajevo, but a double row of soldiers had been placed between Franz Joseph and Bosnian onlookers, with uniformed and plainclothes police mingling in the crowds. For Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the throne, no such security was planned. A devoutly religious man, the Archduke responded to the danger of his visit with the remark that all was in the hands of God.

So unpopular was Habsburg rule in Bosnia that dozens of teenage boys in Sarajevo jumped at the opportunity to join a conspiracy to assassinate the Archduke. Their leader was a nineteen year-old: Gavrilo Princip. He had been beaten by authorities and expelled from high school, and he had fled to Serbia to begin a career as a patriot dedicated to Bosnia's liberation. In 1913 the Serbian army had rejected Princip as physically unfit, and this had made him more determined to perform a heroic feat for his nation.

Princip and his accomplices received their weapons from a group in Serbia called the Narodna Oderana (National Defense) or "Black Hand" - without approval of the Serbian government. On their way back to Sarajevo, the youths had to sneak past Serbia's border guards. Princip and his co-conspirators believed that the Archduke was coming to Sarajevo to prepare an invasion against Serbia. They were unaware or believed it insignificant that the Archduke was unpopular among Austria's influential conservatives for favoring the same kind of autonomy for the Serbs that had been granted the Hungarians.

The Archduke entered Sarajevo in an entourage of automobiles, with the top down on his convertible, chauffeur-driven limousine. Alongside the archduke was his wife. One of the conspirators threw a bomb that bounced off the back of the Archduke's limousine and injured a few people, including two officers in the car that followed. Forgetting about all being in the hands of God, the archduke was furious.

The planned meeting at Sarajevo's city hall was brief, and the still angry Archduke was anxious to punish the town by leaving the city as soon as possible. Driving out of town, the Archduke's entourage of automobiles made a wrong turn and stopped to turn around. The Archduke's car stopped directly in front of Gavrilo Princip. An officer with a sword, standing on the running board, had been added to the archduke's car, but he was on the side opposite Princip. Princip stepped forward and fired two shots. One hit the Archduke and the other bullet accidentally struck the Archduke's wife. Both bled to death as the Archduke's car drove over bumpy roads to a local hospital. And Princip was beaten and dragged off to prison.

The Rush to War

Late that same day, June 28, 1914, news of the assassination reached Serbia's capital, Belgrade, where people had been enjoying a Sunday holiday, and people there began marching in the street expressing their joy with the assassination and singing patriotic songs. The Serbian government wanted no such demonstrations and ordered shops and theaters closed and people off the streets, and the following day the government of Serbia wired its condolences to Austria-Hungary.

The Germans and Austrians put no blame for the assassination on the lack of security for the Archduke. Instead they blamed Serbs in general, and the Serbian government in particular, because the assassins were Serb nationalists and Serbia had been encouraging nationalism. Austrians believed that the Serbs should be punished, and in some areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina - such as Trebinje in Herzegovina - Austrian police hanged numerous innocent Serbs. And in Sarajevo, Moslems and Croats attacked Serb shops, hotels and homes, damaging property and injuring Serbs.

Among the chiefs of state of Europe - who had the power to choose whether there would be war or peace - the emperor Franz Joseph was the first to choose war. His diplomats went to Germany seeking Wilhelm's support for a military move against Serbia. Wilhelm had been a close friend of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife, and he was outraged by their deaths. Without being specific, he gave his backing to Austria-Hungary, saying that the Serbs had to be punished. Wilhelm had little respect for the Serbs, having described them as Asiatics and as a part of the Asiatic threat to Western civilization.

Wilhelm assumed that his cousin, the Russian tsar, Nicholas II, would agree with the Habsburgs punishing the Serbs, the tsar's family having been the victim of regicide. Indeed, Nicholas had proclaimed twelve days of mourning for Archduke Ferdinand.

Wilhelm went on a vacation, sailing off the coast of Norway, believing that no crisis was in the making. To the rest of the world - unaware of Austria-Hungary's plan for war - the crisis over the assassination seemed to have had ended. Poincaré, now president of France, and the French prime minister, Viviani - a socialist and advocate of peace - traveled to Russia's capital, St. Petersburg, where Poincaré reassured the Russians that they had French support. But no evidence exists that Poincaré tried to push the Russians into attacking Germany. No evidence exists that he assured the Russians that if the Russians went to war without first being attacked that France would join the war on their side.

Into the Abyss

When the French leaders began their return to France on July 23, Franz Joseph's government released its ultimatum to Serbia, stating that Serbia either give up its sovereignty or face war. Virtually everyone in Europe was surprised, including Wilhelm, who by now saw no need for war. Wilhelm started his rush to return to Germany, but, given the slowness of transportation during those times, this would take him a few days - a crucial delay.

When Russia's Foreign Minister, Sazonov, heard of Serbia's ultimatum he was frightened. He declared that it meant there would be a European war ("C'est la guerre European"). He began to confront other powers with news of Russia's intent to support Serbia. Meanwhile, he failed to get any assurance of support from, Britain. During these first days of the crisis, Britain appeared to be sitting on the fence.

The British government did not want a European war, and recently British relations with Germany had been improving, to the chagrin of hawkish Frenchmen. The British fleet had been in Germany's Kiel harbor when Wilhelm passed through on his way to his vacation, and there had been much cheering, salutes and good feeling between the British sailors and the Germans. And now, faced with Austria's ultimatum, the British government agreed that Serbia should be punished for the assassination, but, hoping to prevent war, Britain's foreign secretary, Grey, called for an ambassador's conference to meet in London.

Germany's chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, rejected Grey's conference, stating that he opposed Austria-Hungary being "summoned" before a European court of justice. After the assassination of the Archduke, Bethmann-Hollweg pursued a policy that Austria-Hungary should take advantage of the assassination by decidedly crushing Serbia. He believed that  Austria-Hungary could move against Serbia before Russia and France had time to consider going to war. Von Moltke agreed with this policy, and he called on Austria to take military action against Serbia quickly, before diplomatic pressure could be mustered to oppose it. Bethmann-Hollweg and von Moltke appear to have been in a hurry also from fear of some effort at peace that Wilhelm might make after arriving from his vacation.

Four days into the crisis - July 27th - France ordered a standby for mobilizing its military. The French premier, Viviani, was obvious in his not wanting war. And Poincaré - stronger than Viviani in foreign affairs - was to claim that he also did not want war. But some believed that if France refused to back Russia now, France's alliance with Russia would amount to nothing, making France vulnerable to the power of Germany. With British and German relations improving recently, some among the French feared that within a few years Britain might abandon its ties with France.

Russia and Britain remained frustrated over what they saw as Germany's unwillingness to control Austria. The Russian tsar and his ministers believed that backing down in their support for Serbia would be a humiliation that Russia could not now afford. Bethmann-Hollweg began having doubts about Britain not intervening. Wilhelm was back in Germany on the 27th, and he asked Bethmann-Hollweg what went wrong in his absence. And Wilhelm announced that if he could he would prevent war. But it was too late. At 11 in the morning on the 28th, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.

Selling by worried investors brought a drop in prices on Austria's stock exchange, but the prospect of war had brought joy to great numbers of people in Vienna and in Hungary's capital, Budapest. For days people in Vienna paraded, carrying flags and portraits of Franz Joseph and singing patriotic songs. People chanted "God protect our king, our land!" And people chanted "death to Serbs" and "Serb dogs must die!" The archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Piffl, gave voice to what many saw as a holy crusade. He proclaimed that it was the voice of God that spoke through the roar of Austria-Hungary's guns. He called on his flock to go forward in happiness and in confidence to attack the enemies of God.

Pope Pius X took a different approach. The ambassador from Austria asked him to bless the Habsburg armies, and the Pope refused saying he blessed peace.

The same day that Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, Wilhelm received a copy of Serbia's reply to Austria's ultimatum, and he concluded that it was a great success for Austria-Hungary and that it made war against Serbia unnecessary. Wilhelm sent to wire to his cousin Nicholas in Russia expressing hope that the tsar would smooth over difficulties as he, Wilhelm, was trying to do. At 1:45 AM on the 29th, the tsar sent a friendly telegram back to Wilhelm, asking Wilhelm to do what he could to prevent his ally, Austria, from going "too far."

On the 29th, Austrian troops began shelling Belgrade, just across the river Danube from Hungary. That same day, Russia began a partial mobilization of its armies, and Germany and Britain began taking military precautions: Germany began to mobilize its navy, and Britain's navy in the North Sea went to its battle stations.

Also on the 29th, Wilhelm received word from his bother, Prince Henry, that Britain's king George had told him that Britain would remain neutral. In France, Viviani wished to consul Russia to restrain itself, to give Germany no pretext for going to war. On the 30th, Germany's Admiral Tirpitz expressed doubt that Britain would remain neutral, and Wilhelm contradicted him, saying that he, Wilhelm, had "the word of a king" and that this was good enough for him.

In Russia, Tsar Nicholas had favored mobilizing his armies only against Austria-Hungary. Nicholas' war ministers wanted full mobilization, pointing out that partial mobilization would tie up train schedules making full mobilization impossible should Germany go to war alongside Austria. Among those wanting war it was argued that this was the time for it, while France was supporting Russia, that this support might be withdrawn sometime in the future with a rapprochement between Germany and France. There was hope too in Russia among those supporting war that a war would bring an end to the unrest that was plaguing Russia, as the streets of St. Petersburg were filled with striking workers protesting working conditions and low pay.

In the afternoon on the 30th, the indecisive tsar was pushed into choosing full mobilization - directed against Germany as well as Austria-Hungary. His ability to make a decision had been questioned, and he had responded impulsively, to show that he was decisive. He did so believing that peace with Germany could still be maintained, as had happened after Russia had mobilized in 1913.

News of Russia's mobilization reached Germany on the morning of the 31st. Bethmann-Hollweg was now ashen with fear of a European-wide war, and he was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. That same morning Bethmann-Hollweg wired Austria's foreign minister urging the Austrians to refrain from mobilizing against the Russians. Germany's military command, in the person of von Moltke, was, of course, giving priority to what it spoke of as measures of national defense. Von Moltke wired a message to Austria insisting that Austria do its part by countering Russia, and Austria-Hungary's foreign minister chose to ignore Bethmann-Hollweg and to follow the wishes of Germany's military command.

Germany's military command insisted that it was time for Germany to mobilize its armies. Mobilization meant calling up reservists. It was a move against letting belligerent powers acquire an advantage in speed - similar to a fast-draw duel in the American West, but in slow motion. Wilhelm acquiesced, and at 1 PM on the 31st, Germany began mobilizing. Germany sent to Russia an ultimatum that it cease every war measure against Germany within twelve hours. Also Germany sent a query to France asking whether it intended to stay neutral.

By August 1, Poincaré was convinced that war was inevitable, and he wished that it appear to the world that the French were acting defensively. The French were also mobilizing, and a great patriotic fervor was sweeping across their nation. French socialists were buying the notion that France was threatened. Their leader, Jean Juaras, had been adamantly opposed to war, but he had just been assassinated by a lone right-wing nationalist youth who mistakenly saw Juaras as pro-German. The assassination was condemned across France's political spectrum, and France's socialists were siding with war, saying that Juaras was assassinated "but we will not assassinate France." In France, unity going into the war seemed assured. Much of France responded to the news of war with calm and resignation, while in Paris packs of young men roamed the streets, delighted at the opportunity to shout and side with valor. They smashed and looted one German shop after another. Other young men paraded with flags and shouted "Long live France!" and "Long live the army!" Crowds enthusiastically sang their national anthem, the Marseilles, and they sang the national anthems of Britain and Russia. And there were shouts of "On to Berlin!"

On August 1, with Germany 's ultimatum to Russia having passed its deadline, Germany declared war on Russia, a declaration signed by a distraught Wilhelm. News reached Wilhelm causing him to believe that France would stay neutral. Wilhelm ordered a halt to the mobilization against France, which distressed his military high command and almost caused von Moltke to have a nervous breakdown. But soon Wilhelm learned that the news was false, and the mobilization against France continued.

By now, Germany was united in support of their nation going to war. They were told, and they believed, that the French were starting a war against Germany because of jealousy and for revenge. And most frightening for the Germans was their belief that Russian armies were invading. (Imagine how U.S. citizens would have responded if the Russians were actually invading the United States!)

On August 2, while France was organizing the offensive that it had planned against Germany, German military patrols crossed the French frontier, and skirmishes occurred. The British government was concerned about living up to its commitments to France, and, with its navy fully mobilized, it secretly reassured France that it would protect French shipping along the channel coast. But the public in Britain was not yet prepared to accept going to war for France.

Germany's plan for war against France was to avoid the heavy fortifications that the French had built between their two countries and to march through Belgium - low land and the shortest route to Paris. On the evening of the 2nd, Germany sent Belgium a message which spoke of the friendly relations between the two nations, and in polite language the note demanded that Belgium allow Germany's armies peaceful passage. The note promised that if Belgium allowed this and remained neutral that Germany would compensate Belgium for any damages that Germany may inadvertently cause in Belgium. And the note stated that if Belgium chose to resist movement of Germany's troops across its territory, Germany would consider Belgium an enemy.

Belgium refused the German demand. On the 3rd, Germany declared war on France and began to force its way through Belgium. In 1912, French military planners had considered attacking Germany through Belgium, but the British had talked them out of it. Now Germany was claiming that marching through Belgium was justified on the grounds that it was a military necessity. But their attack through Belgium proved to have an impact that the German strategists had not adequately measured. In Britain, the German invasion of Belgium swung numerous members of the Labour Party and much of the nation in favor of war. Germany declared that its march through Belgium was a necessity and that "necessity knew no law," but Britain joining France would prove a much harder circumstance for Germany's military than moving its assault to its border with France.

On the 4th, Britain sent Germany an ultimatum that it cease its attack against Belgium. The deadline was 11 PM. And, with no response, Britain at that hour declared war on Germany. Wilhelm was outraged and depressed. He saw Britain as having joined with France and Russia in order to gang up on Germany. He spoke of his dear grandmother, Queen Victoria, and wished she were still alive. "She" he said, "would not have allowed it." With Britain in the war, he was now more afraid, believing that the war would be long because England was an obstinate nation. Meanwhile, Admiral Tirpitz, considering Britain's strength as a naval power, cried out, that "all was lost."

In London, crowds sang "God Save the King," and "Rule Britannia." They cheered the sight of any man in military uniform. Soon one of Britain's young poets, Rupert Brooke, would capture some of the feeling common in Britain at the start of the war. He thanked God for "matching us with His hour," and he described going to war "as swimmers into cleanness leaping."

In Berlin, crowds paraded with flags, sang Lutheran hymns and shouted "Down with Russia!" In city centers across Germany people cheered the patriotic speeches that described Germany's neighbors as jealous of Germany's progress and as having ganged up on Germany. Among the celebrants in the main plaza in Munich was a twenty-five year-old from Austria, Adolf Hitler. This was, he would write later, the greatest day in his life. He found the unity, patriotism and enthusiasm of his fellow Germans overwhelmingly satisfying. He looked forward to Germany reaching new heights of grandeur, and he enlisted in the German army, hoping to get to the front in time for the action.

Some German aristocrats were oriented toward agrarian values and saw the war as a welcomed break with the bourgeois world of comfort, profit and security. They saw the French as corrupt, as effete and as defenders of a shallow civilization. They saw Britain as a society of contractual relations and driven by commercialism and exploitation. They saw Germany as an organic community and Germans as a people with soul, united by spirit.

Wilhelm, looking white and strained, spoke to the crowd below from his balcony. "I command you now to God," he told them. "Go into the churches, kneel down and pray for help for our soldiers." Germany's soldiers were more joyful. On trains carrying them through German towns toward they front they cheered back at the crowds, and on the sides of the railway cars were optimistic messages such as "Don't worry, we will all soon be eating British beefsteak."

In Russia, the news of war also brought widespread joy. The labor strike in St. Petersburg, said to have been inspired by German agents, melted away and was replaced by patriotic demonstrations, with people carrying pictures of their tsar, and people singing and shouting "God Save the Tsar."  Russia's socialists, liberals and conservatives believed that Russia was a victim and had to be defended from the Germans. Crowds in St. Petersburg attacked and looted the German embassy there. Russians of German ancestry began being expelled from various clubs. And a few people who spoke out against the war were beaten.

Russia's countryside was another matter. When people there received news of the war they wondered who the enemy was this time. Their priests saw it as their duty to give the people guidance, and they told the people that, as in the time of Napoleon, Russia had to fight to preserve its national life and its religion, that Russia would emerge as a greater, true mother of the Slav races and that their Eastern Orthodox Church would remain unshaken. Priests shouted "God be with us! Victory will be ours!" The priests held a cross in their hand, and peasant soldiers going off to war fell to their knees before them, kissed the cross and received the priest's blessings.

The great joy expressed by those going to war, first in Vienna, then in Russia, Berlin and London, was a unique moment in modern history. It was exciting relief from the humdrum of everyday work. It was like a great community disaster that brings people of an otherwise lonely community closer together. In addition to being seen as a great event in their nation's history, it was seen also as a great sporting event. People were expecting the new war to be like those of the nineteenth century: largely the work of heroic soldiers bringing glory to the nation.

Finding Blame

Soon tons of paper would be consumed in declaring innocence and blame regarding the war's beginnings. Franz Joseph was blamed for having given his approval to war against Serbia. Germany's army was accused of pushing Germany into a preventive war. Bethmann-Hollweg's predecessor as chancellor, Prince von Bülow, was upset that Germany had made itself appear as the aggressor, and he found fault in Bethmann-Hollweg giving Austria-Hungary a blank check to do as it pleased against Serbia. And he found fault in Bethmann-Hollweg believing that a war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia would remain localized.

Fault was found with the British government's failure to notify Germany early in the crisis that it would go to war on the side of France and Russia. The British were accused of supporting France and Russia because they feared Germany as a growing power and wanted to contain or cripple Germany. Raymond Poincaré and the French were blamed for encouraging Russia, for wanting to win back Alsace and Lorraine, and for wanting war while circumstances were right. Russia was blamed for its hostility to Germany, for drawing its gun first, by mobilizing, against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Some would conclude that imperialism was the cause of the war. Some would see capitalism as having inevitably led to war. Some would blame autocracy. And a few would blame the war ultimately on Satan, some of them seeing Satan as having invaded the body of Wilhelm.

Lack of foresight and ineptitude must be included in blame for the war. Europe's masses were insufficiently opposed to war, and Europe was not being led by able men, beginning with Franz Joseph and Wilhelm. None of Europe's leaders wanted war across the whole of Europe. And none of them, especially Franz Joseph, was properly restrained by an awareness that such a war would be a disaster for vanquished and victors alike.

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Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all convictions, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

  W.B. Yeats, 1919

 

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