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EUROPE'S SLIDE to WAR (4 of 5)

Kaiser Wilhelm II. He gave his military rein to defend his realm. The best he could have done for that defense -- and survival of his family's rule -- would have been to reject the adage that the best defense in a good offense. He ordered preparations for an offensive against France stopped until he learned that France was indeed joining the war against Germany.

Nicholas II. He was afraid of appearing weak.
(Wikimedia Commons)

Late in day of June 28, 1914, news of the assassination reached Serbia's capital, Belgrade, where people had been enjoying a Sunday holiday. They began marching, expressing their joy with the assassination and singing patriotic songs. The Serbian government wanted no such demonstrations and ordered shops and theaters closed and people off the streets. The following day the government of Serbia wired its condolences to Austria-Hungary.

The Germans and Austrians put no blame for the assassination on the lack of security for the Archduke. Instead they blamed Serbs in general, and the Serbian government in particular, because the assassins were Serb nationalists and Serbia had been encouraging nationalism. Austrians believed that the Serbs should be punished, and in some areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- such as Trebinje in Herzegovina -- Austrian police hanged numerous innocent Serbs. And in Sarajevo, Moslems and Croats attacked Serb shops, hotels and homes, damaging property and injuring Serbs.

Among the chiefs of state of Europe -- who had the power to choose whether there would be war or peace -- the emperor Franz Joseph was the first to choose war. His diplomats went to Germany seeking Wilhelm's support for a military move against Serbia. Wilhelm had been a close friend of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife, and he was outraged by their deaths. Without being specific, he gave his backing to Austria-Hungary, saying that the Serbs had to be punished. Wilhelm had little respect for the Serbs, having described them as Asiatics and as a part of the Asiatic threat to Western civilization.

Wilhelm assumed that his cousin, the Russian tsar, Nicholas II, would agree with the Habsburgs punishing the Serbs, the tsar's family having been the victim of regicide. Indeed, Nicholas had proclaimed twelve days of mourning for Archduke Ferdinand.

Wilhelm went on a vacation, sailing off the coast of Norway, believing that no crisis was in the making. To the rest of the world -- unaware of Austria-Hungary's plan for war -- the crisis over the assassination seemed to have ended. Poincaré, now president of France, and the French prime minister, Viviani -- a socialist and advocate of peace -- traveled to Russia's capital, St. Petersburg, where Poincaré reassured the Russians that they had French support. But no evidence exists that Poincaré tried to push the Russians into attacking Germany. No evidence exists that he assured the Russians that if the Russians went to war without first being attacked that France would join the war on their side.

Into the Abyss

When the French leaders began their return to France on July 23, Franz Joseph's government released its ultimatum to Serbia, stating that Serbia either give up its sovereignty or face war. Virtually everyone in Europe was surprised, including Wilhelm, who by now saw no need for war. Wilhelm started his rush to return to Germany, but, given the slowness of transportation during those times, this would take him a few days -- a crucial delay.

When Russia's Foreign Minister, Sazonov, heard of Serbia's ultimatum he was frightened. He declared that it meant there would be a European war ("C'est la guerre European"). He began to confront other powers with news of Russia's intent to support Serbia. Meanwhile, he failed to get any assurance of support from Britain. During these first days of the crisis, Britain appeared to be sitting on the fence.

The British government did not want a European war, and recently British relations with Germany had been improving, to the chagrin of hawkish Frenchmen. The British fleet had been in Germany's Kiel harbor when Wilhelm passed through on his way to his vacation, and there had been much cheering, salutes and good feeling between the British sailors and the Germans. And now, faced with Austria's ultimatum, the British government agreed that Serbia should be punished for the assassination, but, hoping to prevent war, Britain's foreign secretary, Grey, called for an ambassador's conference to meet in London.

Germany's chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, rejected Grey's conference, stating that he opposed Austria-Hungary being "summoned" before a European court of justice. After the assassination of the Archduke, Bethmann-Hollweg pursued a policy that Austria-Hungary should take advantage of the assassination by decidedly crushing Serbia. He believed that Austria-Hungary could move against Serbia before Russia and France had time to consider going to war. Von Moltke agreed with this policy, and he called on Austria to take military action against Serbia quickly, before diplomatic pressure could be mustered to oppose it. Bethmann-Hollweg and von Moltke appear to have been in a hurry also from fear of some effort at peace that Wilhelm might make after arriving from his vacation.

Four days into the crisis -- July 27th -- France ordered a standby for mobilizing its military. The French premier, Viviani, was obvious in not wanting war. And Poincaré -- stronger than Viviani in foreign affairs -- was to claim that he also did not want war. But some believed that if France refused to back Russia now, France's alliance with Russia would amount to nothing, making France vulnerable to the power of Germany. With British and German relations improving recently, some among the French feared that within a few years Britain might abandon its ties with France.

Russia and Britain remained frustrated over what they saw as Germany's unwillingness to control Austria. The Russian tsar and his ministers believed that backing down in their support for Serbia would be a humiliation that Russia could not now afford. Bethmann-Hollweg began having doubts about Britain not intervening. Wilhelm was back in Germany on the 27th, and he asked Bethmann-Hollweg what went wrong in his absence. And Wilhelm announced that if he could he would prevent war. But it was too late. At 11 in the morning on the 28th, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.

Selling by worried investors brought a drop in prices on Austria's stock exchange, but the prospect of war had brought joy to great numbers of people in Vienna and in Hungary's capital, Budapest. For days people in Vienna paraded, carrying flags and portraits of Franz Joseph and singing patriotic songs. People chanted "God protect our king, our land!" And people chanted "death to Serbs" and "Serb dogs must die!" The archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Piffl, gave voice to what many saw as a holy crusade. He proclaimed that it was the voice of God that spoke through the roar of Austria-Hungary's guns. He called on his flock to go forward in happiness and in confidence to attack the enemies of God.

Pope Pius X took a different approach. The ambassador from Austria asked him to bless the Habsburg armies, and the Pope refused saying he blessed peace.

The same day that Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, Wilhelm received a copy of Serbia's reply to Austria's ultimatum, and he concluded that it was a great success for Austria-Hungary and that it made war against Serbia unnecessary. Wilhelm wired his cousin Nicholas in Russia expressing hope that the tsar would smooth over difficulties as he, Wilhelm, was trying to do. At 1:45 AM on the 29th, the tsar sent a friendly telegram back to Wilhelm, asking Wilhelm to do what he could to prevent his ally, Austria, from going "too far."

On the 29th, Austrian troops began shelling Belgrade, just across the river Danube from Hungary. That same day, Russia began a partial mobilization of its armies, and Germany and Britain began taking military precautions: Germany began to mobilize its navy, and Britain's navy in the North Sea went to its battle stations.

Also on the 29th, Wilhelm received word from his bother, Prince Henry, that Britain's king George had told him that Britain would remain neutral. In France, Viviani wished to counsel Russia to restrain itself, to give Germany no pretext for going to war. On the 30th, Germany's Admiral Tirpitz expressed doubt that Britain would remain neutral, and Wilhelm contradicted him, saying that he, Wilhelm, had "the word of a king" and that this was good enough for him.

In Russia, Tsar Nicholas had favored mobilizing his armies only against Austria-Hungary. Nicholas' war ministers wanted full mobilization, pointing out that partial mobilization would tie up train schedules making full mobilization impossible should Germany go to war alongside Austria. Among the Russians wanting war, it was argued that this was the time for it -- because French support for Russia might be withdrawn sometime in the future with a rapprochement between France and Germany. And those wanting war hoped that it would bring an end to the labor unrest that filled the streets of St. Petersburg with striking workers protesting working conditions and low pay.

In the afternoon on the 30th, the indecisive tsar was pushed into choosing full mobilization -- directed against Germany as well as Austria-Hungary. His ability to make a decision had been questioned, and he had responded impulsively, to show that he was decisive. He did so believing that peace with Germany could still be maintained, as had happened after Russia had mobilized in 1913.

News of Russia's mobilization reached Germany on the morning of the 31st. Bethmann-Hollweg was now ashen with fear of a European-wide war, and he was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. That same morning Bethmann-Hollweg wired Austria's foreign minister urging the Austrians to refrain from mobilizing against the Russians. Germany's military command, in the person of von Moltke, was, of course, giving priority to measures of national defense. Von Moltke wired a message to Austria insisting that Austria do its part by countering Russia, and Austria-Hungary's foreign minister chose to ignore Bethmann-Hollweg and to follow the wishes of Germany's military command.

Germany's military command insisted that it was time for Germany to mobilize its armies. Mobilization meant calling up reservists. It was a move against letting belligerent powers acquire an advantage in speed -- similar to a fast-draw duel in the American West, but in slow motion. Wilhelm acquiesced, and at 1 PM on the 31st, Germany began mobilizing. Germany sent to Russia an ultimatum that it cease every war measure against Germany within twelve hours. Also Germany sent a query to France asking whether it intended to stay neutral.

By August 1, Poincaré was convinced that war was inevitable, and he wished that it appear to the world that the French were acting defensively. The French were also mobilizing, and a great patriotic fervor was sweeping across their nation. French socialists were buying the notion that France was threatened. Their leader, Jean Juaras, had been adamantly opposed to war, but he had just been assassinated by a lone right-wing nationalist youth who mistakenly saw Juaras as pro-German. The assassination was condemned across France's political spectrum, and France's socialists were siding with war, saying that Juaras was assassinated "but we will not assassinate France." In France, unity going into the war seemed assured. Much of France responded to the news of war with calm and resignation, while in Paris packs of young men roamed the streets, delighted at the opportunity to shout and side with valor. They smashed and looted one German shop after another. Other young men paraded with flags and shouted "Long live France!" and "Long live the army!" Crowds enthusiastically sang their national anthem, the Marseilles, and they sang the national anthems of Britain and Russia. And there were shouts of "On to Berlin!"

On August 1, with Germany 's ultimatum to Russia having passed its deadline, Germany declared war on Russia, a declaration signed by a distraught Wilhelm. News reached Wilhelm causing him to believe that France would stay neutral. Wilhelm ordered a halt to the mobilization against France, which distressed his military high command and almost caused von Moltke to have a nervous breakdown. But soon Wilhelm learned that the news was false, and the mobilization against France continued.

By now, Germany was united in support of their nation going to war. They were told, and they believed, that the French were starting a war against Germany because of jealousy and for revenge. And most frightening for the Germans was their belief that Russian armies were invading. (Imagine how U.S. citizens would have responded if the Russians were actually invading the United States!)

On August 2, while France was organizing the offensive that it had planned against Germany, German military patrols crossed the French frontier, and skirmishes occurred. The British government was concerned about living up to its commitments to France, and, with its navy fully mobilized, it secretly reassured France that it would protect French shipping along the channel coast. But the public in Britain was not yet prepared to accept going to war for France.

Germany's plan for war against France was to avoid the heavy fortifications that the French had built between their two countries and to march through Belgium -- low land and the shortest route to Paris. On the evening of the 2nd, Germany sent Belgium a message which spoke of the friendly relations between the two nations, and in polite language the note demanded that Belgium allow Germany's armies peaceful passage. The note promised that if Belgium allowed this and remained neutral that Germany would compensate Belgium for any damages that Germany may inadvertently cause in Belgium. And the note stated that if Belgium chose to resist movement of Germany's troops across its territory, Germany would consider Belgium an enemy.

Belgium refused the German demand. On the 3rd, Germany declared war on France and began to force its way through Belgium. In 1912, French military planners had considered attacking Germany through Belgium, but the British had talked them out of it. Now Germany was claiming that marching through Belgium was justified on the grounds that it was a military necessity. But their attack through Belgium proved to have an impact that the German strategists had not adequately measured. In Britain, the German invasion of Belgium swung numerous members of the Labour Party and much of the nation in favor of war. Germany declared that its march through Belgium was a necessity and that "necessity knew no law," but Britain joining France would prove a much harder circumstance for Germany's military than moving its assault to its border with France.

On the 4th, Britain sent Germany an ultimatum that it cease its attack against Belgium. The deadline was 11 PM. And, with no response, Britain at that hour declared war on Germany. Wilhelm was outraged and depressed. He saw Britain as having joined with France and Russia in order to gang up on Germany. He spoke of his dear grandmother, Queen Victoria, and wished she were still alive. "She" he said, "would not have allowed it."

Britain's motives for going to war have been described as different from Wilhelm's characterization. In The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 Paul M. Kennedy writes that the British feared that the Germans would again smash the French -- as they did in 1870 -- and would gain control over northwest France and the English Channel, and that his would be catastrophic for British security. ( pp. 464-70)

In London, crowds sang "God Save the King," and "Rule Britannia." They cheered the sight of any man in military uniform. Soon one of Britain's young poets, Rupert Brooke, would capture some of the feeling common in Britain at the start of the war. He thanked God for "matching us with His hour," and he described going to war "as swimmers into cleanness leaping."

With Britain in the war, King Wilhelm was now more afraid, believing that the war would be long because England was an obstinate nation. Meanwhile, Admiral Tirpitz, considering Britain's strength as a naval power, cried out, that "all was lost."

In Berlin, crowds paraded with flags, sang Lutheran hymns and shouted "Down with Russia!" In city centers across Germany people cheered the patriotic speeches that described Germany's neighbors as jealous of Germany's progress and as having ganged up on Germany. Among the celebrants in the main plaza in Munich was a twenty-five year-old from Austria, Adolf Hitler. This was, he would write later, the greatest day in his life. He found the unity, patriotism and enthusiasm of his fellow Germans overwhelmingly satisfying. He looked forward to Germany reaching new heights of grandeur, and he enlisted in the German army, hoping to get to the front in time for the action.

Some German aristocrats were oriented toward agrarian values and saw the war as a welcomed break with the bourgeois world of comfort, profit and security. They saw the French as corrupt, as effete and as defenders of a shallow civilization. They saw Britain as a society of contractual relations and driven by commercialism and exploitation. They saw Germany as an organic community and Germans as a people with soul, united by spirit.

Wilhelm, looking white and strained, spoke to the crowd below from his balcony. "I command you now to God," he told them. "Go into the churches, kneel down and pray for help for our soldiers." Germany's soldiers were more joyful. On trains carrying them through towns toward the front they cheered back at the crowds, and on the sides of the railway cars were optimistic messages such as "Don't worry, we will all soon be eating British beefsteak."

In Russia, the news of war also brought widespread joy. The labor strike in St. Petersburg, said to have been inspired by German agents, melted away and was replaced by patriotic demonstrations, with people carrying pictures of their tsar, and people singing and shouting "God Save the Tsar."  Russia's socialists, liberals and conservatives believed that Russia was a victim and had to be defended from the Germans. Crowds in St. Petersburg attacked and looted the German embassy there. Russians of German ancestry began being expelled from various clubs. And a few people who spoke out against the war were beaten.

Russia's countryside was another matter. When people there received news of the war they wondered who the enemy was this time. Their priests saw it as their duty to give the people guidance, and they told the people that, as in the time of Napoleon, Russia had to fight to preserve its national life and its religion, that Russia would emerge as a greater, true mother of the Slav races and that their Eastern Orthodox Church would remain unshaken. Priests shouted "God be with us! Victory will be ours!" The priests held a cross in their hand, and peasant soldiers going off to war fell to their knees before them, kissed the cross and received the priests' blessings.

The great joy expressed by those going to war, first in Vienna, then in Russia, Berlin and London, was a unique moment in modern history. It was exciting relief from the humdrum of everyday work. It was like a great community disaster that brings people of an otherwise lonely community closer together. In addition to being seen as a great event in their nation's history, it was seen also as a great sporting event. People were expecting the new war to be like those of the nineteenth century: largely the work of heroic soldiers bringing glory to the nation.