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WORLD WAR and REBELLION to 1919
With Poincaré, the French had begun building up their military forces, and Germany countered. A new arms race was underway. A few dissident intellectuals in Europe had been trying to warn their nations about how different a war among the great industrial powers of Europe would be from wars of the previous century. But Germany's military leaders continued to believe that the next war could be as short and sweet as their last victory -- six months of war against France that ended in 1871 with only 28,000 dead. That had been a war in which speed in mobilization was most important, in other words a matter of getting to the battle first with the most. It had been a war in which no stalemate and trench warfare had developed. There was also the belief among leaders that the war might be prolonged. German army at any rate had a strategy for the next war, believing that the best defense was an offense. Its leadership was confident that their plan to march to Paris across the shortest route -- through Belgium -- would bring victory within a few weeks. Marching through Belgium they believed was the best plan.
The French were also burdened by misconception regarding military matters -- not only about the duration of the next war but also about how the war should be fought. A commander-in-chief designate of France's armies, General Victor Michel, correctly anticipated that Germany's drive against France would come through the lowlands of Belgium, and he advocated taking defensive positions against the Germans. The dominant view among France's generals was that they should pursue an offensive strategy. Michel was ostracized and demoted. Victory, they believed, would be achieved by the fighting spirit of their armies. This included putting aside machine guns because, they believed, machine guns were for defense. They were opposed to discontinuing the use of the army's red trousers and blue jackets, colors they thought matched the army's élan and glory. And they believed that Russia's vast army -- the "Russian steamroller" -- would provide effective help.
Amid all the backward thinking about war, in 1911 a minor war erupted with Italy responding to France's gains in Morocco by seeking gain of its own in North Africa. Italy warred against the Ottoman Empire for possession of Tripoli and Cyrenaica -- today, Libya. The Turks lost and appeared weak to Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, and these nations, in May, 1912, thought it opportune to fight the Turks for territory they believed was theirs. Germany backed the Turks and France backed Serbia. The Turks lost again, and in October the Turks were forced to grant independence to Albania. Then Serbia and Greece began fighting with Bulgaria over the spoils of victory. In 1913, Serbia emerged from these wars triumphant. Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hercegovina) were elated and encouraged. Serbia and Greece divided Macedonia between them, and Serbia moved to acquire a port on the Albanian coast.
Austria-Hungary feared Serbia's new prestige and disliked the aroused Serbian nationalism. In Bosnia, Austrian authorities seized local newspapers, expelled student leaders and put schools under direct military rule. Austria-Hungary opposed Serbia's acquisition of a seaport on the Albanian coast, and it threatened Serbia with war. Russia announced its determination to support Serbia militarily. Serbia wanted no war with Austria-Hungary and withdrew from the Albanian coastline, and Emperor Wilhelm of Germany refused to give military support to Austria-Hungary. Wilhelm's treaty with Austria-Hungary was defensive, and he felt no obligation to back Austria-Hungary in an offensive against Serbia. Austria-Hungary feared war against Russia without Germany fighting on its side, and so war was averted.
The year 1913 ended with leading strategists in Austria-Hungary still favoring war against Serbia, and against Russia if Russia intervened. Austria-Hungary's military leaders feared Russia's growing military capability, and they favored getting the war with Serbia over with before Russia strengthened its military forces.
The hawks in Austria-Hungary had an ally in Germany's supreme army commander, von Moltke, who wrote his Austrian counterpart that a war between "Germandom" (which included German Austrians) and "Slavdom" (the Russians and Serbs) was inevitable. Von Moltke believed that "eternal peace" was a "pipe dream" and that if war were inevitable it would be best to launch it at a most opportune time. He too was concerned about the growing strength of Russia's military, and he believed it would be opportune to have a war before Russia and France had time to reduce significantly the gap in military capability between themselves and Germany. Germany's Admiral von Tirpitz also appears to have wanted war, but not with Britain. He believed that Germany should not go to war until it had completed widening the Kiel Canal for Germany's new fleet of submarines -- estimated to be finished in 1916.
In Germany were many opposed to war, including Social Democrats and some businessmen. But Germany had its paranoid types -- super defensive and aggressive toward perceived enemies. They believed that Britain and its allies were bent on war against Germany, and they favored a "preventive war." Some others were willing to go to war at any time. They remembered with pride the German victory over France in 1871, and they looked forward to the next war engendering a spirit of heroism and self-sacrifice in the place of the materialism and moral rot that they saw around them. And, with optimism, they looked forward to the next war settling the disquieting differences that had risen among the European powers.
In Russia, those around the tsar who favored peace with Germany were losing influence to those who had grown more hostile to Germany. These more hostile men were displeased by German and Austrian economic penetration into the Balkans and Germany's growing economic ties with the Ottoman Empire. Germany had sold weapons to Turkey in its recent wars, and following Turkey's defeat, Germany had begun reorganizing Turkey's military, and the Russians saw this as a threat to Russia's shipping through the Black Sea into the Mediterranean.
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Copyright © 1998 by Frank E. Smitha. All rights reserved.