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The KOREAN WAR (2 of 8)

In Tokyo, General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the U.S. forces in the Pacific, wanted Washington to give more importance to developments in Asia. He saw communism as more of a threat in Asia than it was in Europe. And in March, 1949, seven months before Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China, MacArthur described the U.S. defense parameter in the Far East as starting in the Philippines, running through Okinawa and the other Ryukyu islands to Japan and then to the Aleutian Islands and Alaska. MacArthur had left China and Korea -- the Asian continent -- outside this perimeter. [note]

The U.S. was training and supplying South Korea's military. But Washington did not want the South making trouble by invading the North. In order to prevent this, it kept South Korea's military capacity limited while leaving Syngman Rhee's government with enough military strength to combat the leftist guerrillas fighting his government.

The Truman administration was eager to pull its troops out of Korea, to give the Republic of Korea an aura of independence. The Russians in late 1948 had announced that they had pulled their troops out of North Korea, and, on June 29, U.S. military units withdrew from Korea, leaving behind an advisory group of about 500 Americans.

Kim Il Sung, North Korea's leader journeyed to Moscow to meet with Stalin and requested aid so he could unite Korea by force. Stalin asked him some blunt questions. Kim replied that he was confident that he could defeat the forces of South Korea. But Stalin advised against it -- in keeping with his preferring to avoid provoking the West. He told Kim that it was important that the 38th parallel remain peaceful.

Truman's secretary of state after his 1948 election victory was Dean Acheson, an anti-Communist who also believed in patience. Communists acquired power in China in December 1949, and Acheson said it was something that Americans would need to accept for at least awhile. He said that people should learn to live with evil and observed that it had been around since the fall of Adam and Eve.

On January 12, 1950, at a National Press Club briefing, Secretary of State Acheson spoke of American interests in the Far East and described a defense parameter that was similar to MacArthur's. Acheson said nothing about defending South Korea from an attack by North Korea, but he believed this was needed no more that he had to mention New Zealand or Australia in the U.S. defense parameter.

A document fundamental to the Truman Administrations foreign policy was the National Security Council (NSC) 48/2, which focused on stopping Communist expansion by giving economic and military aid to various countries: to the French in their fight against Ho Chi Minh, to the Philippines government in its fight against the Huk guerrillas, and to the British in their fight against guerrillas in Malaya. There was in the document no mention of U.S. military intervention anywhere, including defending Chiang's forces on Taiwan.

The Communists in Moscow and in North Korea apparently foresaw no quick move by Washington to send troops to defend the Republic of Korea. Kim Il Sung was complaining to the Soviet Union that peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula was impossible. He was encouraged by the communist victory in China and said that the Korean people want liberation and would not understand why the opportunity to have it was missed. Stalin also was impressed by the victory of the communists in China and perhaps by his possession of the atomic bomb, and he wanted more success for his side in the class war as compensation for failures in Europe. On January 30, Stalin informed Kim Il Sung in a telegram that he was now willing to help Kim in his plan to unify Korea. In the discussions with Kim that followed, Stalin suggested that in return for his support he would like a yearly minimum of 25,000 tons of lead. He advised Kim to minimize risk, the cautious Stalin apparently believing that it was possible to win a quick victory and present the world with a fait accompli.

Mao and his associates concurred in this, Mao having told Stalin that it was his opinion that the U.S. would not intervene in Korea. Mao had been looking forward to furthering his advance against his enemy Chiang Kai-shek, now in Taiwan, which Mao saw as a part of China, and Mao believed that the U.S. would not intervene there.

After Acheson's comments on January 12 came signs of Washington changing course in its strategy regarding the Far East. On January 25, General Omar Bradley of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in off-the-record testimony, that a potential enemy (Communist China) possessing Taiwan would be a threat to America's position in the Pacific. In February, the alliance between China and the Soviet Union, signed that month, alarmed strategists in Washington. A revised bill on Korean aid reached Congress and was signed into law by Truman later that month. Acheson spoke of the importance of supporting pro-Western South Korea. And in early June, reflecting an increased concern over Korea, the Acheson State Department sent its Republican operative, John Foster Dulles, to South Korea. Dulles visited the 38th parallel on June 17, and there he spoke of America's determination to stand by South Korea.

But Kim Il Sung and Stalin were not about to reverse themselves. They either dismissed the new signs as insignificant or were delaying analysis. Kim remained confident and unaware, not unlike the Athenians before the Peloponnesian War.